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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By JOHN CAREY*
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
AND THE CONVICT
A. Double Jeopardy
In Krutka v. Spinuzzi1 the court was presented with the ques-
tion whether a retrial of Spinuzzi, who had been acquitted of mur-
der, would be in violation of his right under the Colorado Constitu-
tion not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.- At his
trial, after presentation of the State's evidence, Spinuzzi had ob-
tained a directed verdict of not guilty on the grounds that the evi-
dence was legally insufficient. The State brought error under a
statute providing for review of criminal cases on behalf of the
State,3 whereupon the supreme court "disapproved" the action of
the trial court.4 Spinuzzi was then rearrested upon the issuance of
an alias capias. He applied for and was granted a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds of double jeopardy, and the sheriff to whom
the writ was directed sought a review of that decision.
Before the supreme court, Spinuzzi argued that he had been
placed in jeopardy at the moment the jury in the original trial was
impaneled and sworn; a retrial on the same charge therefore would
not only violate his rights under the Colorado Constitution5 but also
was prohibited by the statute which had authorized the review of
his acquittal. 6 The statute contains an express limitation that it shall
not be construed "so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a second
time for the same offense."
The sheriff argued in reply that under the Colorado Constitu-
tion a defendant is not deemed to have been in jeopardy if a crimi-
nal judgment is reversed for an error of law and that therefore the
defendant had not yet been placed in jeopardy. Furthermore, even
if he had been in jeopardy, it was a continuing one which would
not be terminated until the completion of a trial free from error.
The court rejected the "single and continuing jeopardy" con-
cept, stating in answer to Krutka's argument (the concept is logical
and appeals to the common sense): "We are not permitted to be
governed by our personal concept as to what the law in this regard
ought to be, but rather to determine what the law, in Colorado, is."'7
The most important development of the case is the interpreta-
tion of article II, section 18, of the Colorado Constitution., It has
long been established that, by virtue of this section, a defendant
* Senior student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 384 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1963).
2 Colo. Const. art. 11, § 18. "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal
case nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If the jury disagree, or
if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law,
the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy."
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39.7-27 (1953). "Writs of error shall lie on behalf of the state, or the people,
to review decisions of the trial court in any criminal case upon question of law arising upon the
trial .... Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense."
4 People v. Spinuzzi, 149 Colo. 391, 369 P.2d 427 (1962).
5 Supro, note 2.
6 Supra, note 3.
7 384 P.2d at 935.
8 Supro, note 2.
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who obtains a reversal of his conviction may not avoid a second
trial for the same offense on grounds of multiple jeopardy.9 The
same is true of the "implied acquittal" of the greater offense
charged when the defendant appeals the conviction of a lesser in-
cluded offense.10 The supreme court has not previously had occa-
sion to determine the effect of the section on the status of a defend-
ant whose acquittal has been reversed at the instance of the State."
Although it could be argued that it did not have such an occasion
in this case,'12 the court nevertheless determined to decide the issue.
It rejected the sheriff's argument by examining the "state of things
existing when the constitution was framed and adopted, ' 13 and con-
cluding:
As of 1876 only the defendant had the right to a writ
of error in a criminal proceeding. Hence, when read in this
context, Article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution
was of necessity only intended to preclude a defendant who
on appeal obtained a reversal of his judgment of conviction
from thereafter claiming former jeopardy when the state
sought to try him for the same offense.
14
In other words, the constitution does not preclude the defendant
from claiming former jeopardy if the State secures a reversal of
his judgment of acquittal.
This decision seems to be in line with the general import of a
number of Colorado cases. In nearly every criminal case in which
the State has obtained a review of an acquittal and in which the
supreme court has found error, the action of the trial court has not
been reversed but merely "disapproved.' 15 This disapproval was
made over the persistent contention that the cases should be rever-
sed,16 a clear indication that the court recognized that a question of
double jeopardy would arise as a result of such a reversal.
Although this article is concerned primarily with the constitu-
tion, it seems advisable to consider briefly what influence Krutka
v. Spinuzzi will have on the efficacy of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-27.17 Since
the court expressly declared that the statute was "not at odds" with
the constitution,' 8 the State will continue to have the right in a
criminal proceeding to secure a review of an acquittal. But it will
not be able in such a review to obtain a reversal of the judgment.
9 Packer v. People, 8 Colo. 361, 8 Pac. 564 (1885); Garvey's Case, 7 Colo. 384, 3 Pac. 903 (1884).
10 Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac. 1011 (1913).
11 Only one previous review under this statute "upon question of law arising upon the trial"
has resulted in a reversal. People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179, 228 P.2d 163 (1951). In that case the
district attorney elected not to proceed further. In two other cases, decided on the some day and
arising out of the same incident, the court "disapproved and reversed" in short opinions by Mr.
Justice Burke. People v. Shirley, 72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327 (1922); People v. Corbett, 72 Colo.
117, 209 Pac. 808 (1922).
12 The action of the trial court was not reversed in People v. Spinuzzi, supra, note 2, only "dis-
approved." Therefore, the constitutional provision relied upon by Krutka is, strictly speaking, not
applicable at all and need not be construed. Perhaps the court felt that the time had come to re-
solve the question raised by the dissents in the cases cited in footnote 16, infra.
13 384 P.2d at 933.
14 Ibid.
15 People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233, 343 P.2d 1058 (1959); People v. Gomez, 131 Colo. 476,
283 P.2d 949 (1955); People v. Wilson, 106 Colo. 435, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Peaple v. Kilpatrick,
79 Colo. 303, 245 Pac. 719 (1926); People v. Bartels, 77 Colo. 498, 238 Pac. 51 (1925); People v.
Bright, 77 Colo. 563, 238 Pac. 71 (1925). But see People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179, 228 P.2d 163
(1951); People v. Snirley, 72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327 (1922); People v. Corbett, 72 Colo. 117, 209
Pac. 808 (1922).
16 People v. Byrnes, 117 Colo. 528, 190 P.2d 584 (1948) (dissent by Mr. Justice Burke); People v.
Rapini, 107 Colo. 363, 112 P.2d 551 (1941) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Burke, joined by Mr.
Justice Bouck); People v. Wilson, 106 Colo. 435, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940) (concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke, joined by Mr. Justice Young).
17 Supro, note 3.
18 384 P.2d at 931.
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It is apparent, therefore, that a "disapproval" of the case can have
no adverse effect upon the defendant. This being so, there is nothing
to persuade him to argue the case before the supreme court.1 9 The
ultimate effect of this decision, then, is that the supreme court will
be called upon to render an advisory opinion that can have effect
only on future decisions based upon unilateral argument. Is it rea-
sonable or just to adjudge defendants in those future cases by rules
of law established without the benefit of adversary proceedings?
B. Equal Protection or Due Process
In Vanderhoof v. People20 the defendant was charged under
C.R.S. '53 § 40-2-3221 with four counts of indecent liberties. The dis-
trict attorney withdrew three charges and the defendant pleaded
guilty to one charge. Before accepting the defendant's plea, the
court warned him it would subject him to a possible term of impris-
onment of fourteen years in the state penitentiary. The court then
accepted the plea and, following procedures set forth in the Sex
Offenders Act,22 sentenced the defendant to not less than one day
nor more than life in the state penitentiary.
A petition in the district court to correct judgment and sentence
to conform with the maximum penalty of ten years under C.R.S.
'53 § 40-2-32 was denied, and the defendant brought error to the
Supreme Court of Colorado alleging:
(1) the Sex Offenders Act constitutes a denial of the equal
protection of the law since it prescribes a penalty different
from that of C.R.S. '53 § 40-2-32; the state therefore treats
19 In fact, no appearance was made for Spinuzzi in People v. Spinuzzi, 149 Colo. 391, 369 P.2d
427 (1962).
20 380 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1963).
21 "Assault on child under sixteen.-Any person over the age of fourteen years who shall as-
sault any child under sixteen years of age and shall take indecent and improper liberties with the
person of such child, or who shall entice, allure or persuade any such child into any room, office
or to any other place for the purpose of taking such immodest, immoral and indecent liberties
with such child, or who shall take or attempt to take such liberties with the person of such child
at any place, shall be deemed a felonious assaulter, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished, if over eighteen years of age, by confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not more
than ten years, and, if under eighteen years of age, may be punished by commitment to the state
reformatory or to the state industrial school."
22Cola. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (Perm. Supp. 1960).-"Indeterminate sentences to institu-
tions.-For the better administration of justice and the more efficient control, treatment and reha-
bilitation of persons convicted of the crimes of indecent liberties, incest, assault with intent to com-
mit unnatura carnal copulation, assault with intent to commit rape, if the district court is of the
opinion that any such person, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the
public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill, the district court in lieu of the sentence now
provided by low, for each such crime, may sentence such person to a state institution for an in-
determinate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life."
Sections 2 to 10 set forth the procedure to be followed when one is sentenced pursuant to the
Sex Offenders Act.
Expert e Commercial Printing
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a sex offender sentenced under the Act differently from a
sex offender sentenced under § 40-2-32;
(2) the classification of persons under the Sex Offenders Act
is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious because the clas-
sification is determined by the discretion of the sentencing
judge acting solely in his own opinion;
(3) the sentence was void because the defendant was warned
of a possible fourteen years sentence and was subsequently
given an indeterminate sentence which could extend to
life imprisonment.
The court dismissed the first two contentions, holding that the
state legislature can classify persons upon reasonable and natural
distinctions and that under the Sex Offender Act the trial judge
only determines whether the defendant factually comes within the
predetermined classification set forth in the Act; he does not deter-
mine the classification. However, the defendant's third contention
created a question technically of first impression in Colorado. The
court, citing three Colorado decisions as authority,23 stated
[T] he provisions of the statute dealing with arraignment,
advice of counsel, warning as to consequences of the plea,
taking of evidence in mitigation and aggravation, and pre-
sentence investigation are mandatory and a prerequisite
under due process.
24
The court then held that the life sentence imposed by the trial court
was void, as the defendant had not been warned in advance of this
possible consequence of his guilty plea.
The court next considered whether the judgment as well as the
sentence was void and quoting from Little v. People25 held: ". . . a
failure to comply strictly with the statute does not affect the vali-
dity of the judgment but only the sentence, and in a proper case
might require the remanding . . . and re - sentencing. '26 Since
the trial court erred in warning the defendant he could receive
fourteen years imprisonment as opposed to only ten years under
the statute the defendant was charged with violating, the supreme
court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the
cause with instructions to resentence the defendant within the
limits of one day to ten years.
Adequate support can be found for the court's holding on Van-
derhoof's first two contentions,27 but its treatment of the defendant's
third contention is unclear. The court's reference to "due process"
is perhaps misleading. A mere casual reading of those cases cited
by the court as support for its statement that the provisions of the
statute are mandatory and a prerequisite under due process28 in-
dicates that those cases were decided solely on statutory interpreta-
23 Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863 (1959); Smith v. Best, Warden, 115 Colo. 494,
176 P.2d 686 (1946); Arrano v. People, 24 Colo. 233, 49 Pac. 271 (1897).
24 380 P.2d at 905 (emphasis supplied).
25 138 Colo. 572, 575, 335 P.2d 863, 864 (1959).
26 380 P.2d at 905.
27 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (sexual psychopath low held
constitutional on its face as construed by the highest court of the state); People v. Scherbing, 93
Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949) (Youth Authority Act not violative of equal protection of the
low); People v. Israel, 91 Cal. App. 2d 773, 206 P.2d 62 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 838 (1949)
(discretion of trial judge under Habitual Criminal Statute pertains only to sentencing and the
judge properly has discretion to vary punishment); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 790 (1952);
People v. Johnson, 412 Ill. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766 (1952), cert. denied, Johnson v. State, 344 U.S. 858
(1954).
28 Supra, note 26.
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tion-not constitutional principles. 9 It is my opinion that the pres-
ent court used the term "due process" only in the sense of the
"proper statutory procedure" to be followed under C.R.S. '53 §
39-7-8.30
This statute sets forth mandatory procedures for the court to
follow when a defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea. The require-
ments are divided into two portions-those proceedings which the
court must follow prior to the acceptance of the plea, and those
proceedings to be followed prior to sentencing.31 The Arrano, Smith,
and Little cases cited by the court as authority for its holding that
a sentence is void if the procedures of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-35 are not
followed are all concerned with procedural error arising after the
guilty plea has been accepted by the court and prior to the sentenc-
ing. In the Vanderhoof case the supreme court had to deal with
error arising both before the acceptance of the guilty plea and be-
fore the sentencing. The latter error, i.e., the imposition of a life
sentence when the defendant had only been warned of a possible
fourteen year sentence, was properly disposed of whether the court
based its decision on constitutional or on statutory grounds. If error
appears only at the presentencing stages, only the sentence and not
the judgment should be voided.
The first error committed by the trial court, i.e., the warning
of a possible fourteen year sentence when defendant could only, by
statute, receive a maximum ten year sentence, was error arising
prior to the acceptance of the plea of guilty by the trial court.
Obviously, the supreme court could not remand the cause with in-
structions to resentence the defendant to a term within the limits
of from one to fourteen years as he was originally instructed by the
trial judge; the statute under which the defendant was charged
permitted a maximum sentence of ten years. The court therefore
had two choices as to its final disposition of the Vanderhoof case:
It could find that both the sentence and the judgment were void;
or it could hold that only the sentence was void.
32
In choosing the latter alternative, the court relied solely on
language from the Little case.33 As has been indicated supra, the
court in that case did not consider whether error arising prior to
29 Supra, note 23. All three cases are founded on alleged violations of statute requiring that
when a plea of guilty is accepted by the trial court, if the court possesses any discretion as to
the extent of the punishment, it shall be the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the
aggravation and mitigation of the offense.
30 "Plea of guilty - court to examine witnesses. - In all cases where the party indicted shall
plead guilty, such plea shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the
accused the consequences of entering such plea, after which, if the party indicted persists in plead-
ing guilty, said plea shall be received and recorded, and the court proceed to render judgment and
execution thereon, as if he had been found guilty by a jury. In all cases where the court possesses
any discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it shall be the duty of the court to examine
witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense."
While this statute is not mentioned by name in the court's opinion, the court gives two "hints"
that this statute forms the basis for its decision. First, the court casually makes reference to some
mystical statute, the provisions of which are mandatory and a prerequisite under due process.
Second, Little v. People, Smit+, v. Best, Warden, and Arrono v. People all consider the proper
procedure to be followed under this statute or its predecessors, i.e., Cola. Stat. Ann. ch. 48 § 482
(1935), and Mills' Ann. Stat. § 1463.
31 This division is specifically recognized in Little v. People. "This statute is divided into two
parts, viz: The duty of the trial court to explain the consequences of a plea of guilty before receiving
it; and, the duty of the trial court to examine witnesses as to aggravation and mitigation of the
offense ....
32 While defendant Vanderhoof did not challenge the validity of the trial court's judgment, the
supreme court, of its own initiative, discusses this matter.
33 138 Colo. 572, 575, 335 P.2d 863, 864 (1959). "[A] failure to comply strictly with the statute
does not affect the validity of the judgment but only the sentence, and in a proper case might require
remanding for the taking of evidence and resentencing."
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the acceptance of the guilty plea would void the judgment. 34 Fur-
thermore, while the court in the Little case held that failure to
comply strictly with the provisions of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-8 would not
void the judgment, the minor error found in that case35 is not com-
parable to the error committed by the trial judge in the Vanderhoof
case.
While it may seem that no injustice is done to one who pleads
guilty under the belief that he may receive a fourteen year sentence
when in fact he can only receive a maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment, I submit that in certain cases a defendant may think
it better to plead "not guilty" when only a short maximum penalty
is involved and plead "guilty" and rely on the leniency of the court
when he may receive a longer maximum penalty. Furthermore,
future cases arising under § 39-7-8 will be founded on error differ-
ent from that arising in the Vanderhoof case. Will the judgment be
voided when a defendant, charged under a statute providing for a
mandatory penalty of forty years imprisonment, is told by the trial
judge that he may receive only a ten year maximum imprisonment,
and he thereby pleads "guilty"?
36
34 The defendant alleged that the court did not sufficiently apprise him of his right to counsel -
error arising prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. Since the court found that no error was
committed by the trial judge at this stage of the proceedings, it never decided whether
the judgment would be void if error had been found.
35 The error to which the court was referring when it said " ... a failure to comply strictly
with the statute does not affect the valildity of the judgment but only the sentence," was the failure
of the court to examine witnesses as to mitigation or aggravation of the offense. Under § 39-7-8,
it is the duty of the court to take such evidence. However, in the Little case, the trial court
asked the defendant if he had any evidence he wished to introduce, and the defendant answered
in the negative. The trial judge did not examine witnesses but considered the Probation Officer's
report and the F.B.I. report as to mitigation or aggravation of the offense. The defendant therefore
had an opportunity to have witnesses examined but waived this method of having the court
apprised of the facts. While the court did not comply strictly with the provisions of § 39-7-8, the
defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to have witnesses examined.
In the- Vanderhoof case, however, the defendant was incorrectly forewarned of the con-
sequences of his plea. This would seem to be prejudicial error as opposed to failure on the part
of the trial judge to comply strictly with the statutory mandates.
36 An indication of the answer to this question can be found in Glass v. People, 127 Colo. 210,
255 P.2d 738 (1953). The trial judge, pursuant to Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 48, § 482 (1935), informed
the defendant that he might be subjected to life imprisonment as a result of his guilty plea;
the Habitual Criminal Statute under which the defendant was charged made the imposition of a
life sentence mandatory. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, and after
being denied a petition to vacate judgment and sentence, he brought error to the Supreme Court
of Colorado alleging as error the failure of the trial court to properly forewarn him of the con-
sequences of his guilty plea. The court found that under the "facts of the . .. case the right of
defendant to be advised concerning the consequences of his pleas of guilty was sufficiently protected."
The facts of the case show that the trial court made certain the defendant had been informed by
counsel as to the consequences of his plea. Furthermore, the court felt that language employed by
the trial court in informing the defendant of the consequences of his plea was not such as would
deprive the defendant of his rights under the statute. The tenor of the court's opinion, however,
is unclear whether the decision would have been the same had the defendant not been apprised,
by counsel, of the consequences of his plea.
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C. Search and Seizure
The Colorado Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures. '37 It does not, however, prohibit the introduction into
evidence of materials obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision.
38
The Constitution of the United States similarly prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures.39 It has been interpreted to require
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained.40 But since the Bill
of Rights has been held to apply only to the Federal Government,
41
the Fourth Amendment does not require such exclusion in state
courts.
4 2
Recent United States Supreme Court cases, however, have ex-
tended the meaning of "due process of law" as guaranteed against
the states in the Fourteenth Amendment 43 to include unreasonable
searches and seizures, 44 with the result that the federal exclusionary
rule is extended to the state courts.4  The states remain free to
apply their own evidentiary standards so long as they do not violate
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court as a limit.
46
In Hernandez v. People47 the Supreme Court of Colorado pro-
vided working guidelines for its definition of "unreasonable." Her-
nandez was arrested under a warrant for assault to murder. In
addition, three search warrants for the seizure of marijuana were
issued. In the affidavits in support of the search warrants,48 the
affiant swore that "he has reason to believe" that Hernandez had
37 Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. "The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be
seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced
to writing."
38 Williams v, People, 136 Colo. 164, 315 P.2d 189 (1957); Wolf v. People, 117 Cola. 279, 187
P.2d 926 (1947); Bills v. People, 113 Colo. 326, 157 P.2d 139 (1945); Roberts v. People, 78 Colo.
555, 243 Pac. 544 (1925); Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).
39 U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
40 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Grau v. United States; 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904);
Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1889).
42 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. " . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law . . . .
44 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
45 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46 This statement is based upon the following words from the opinion of Mr. Justice Clark on
pages 33 and 34 of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963): " . .. although the standard of reason-
ableness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our federal
system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible because of our supervisory
powers over federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution. We reiterate that the reasonableness of a search! is in the first instance a substantive
determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case and in
light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in opinions of this
Court applying that Amendment. Findings of reasonableness, of course, are respected only insofar
as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees .... The States are not . . . precluded from
developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical demands
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do
not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant
command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain."
47 385 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1963).
48 Mr. Justice PrIngle emphasized the fact that the Colorado Constitution requires that probable
cause be supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. See note 1, supra.
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the property and that it had been or was intended to be used in the
commission of a criminal offense. The basis of the affiant's belief
was not given.
Hernandez was arrested and searched; a stolen dictating ma-
chine was found in his automobile. He was charged with and con-
victed of receiving stolen property. Before the supreme court on
writ of error, he assigned as error the admission into evidence of
the dictating machine over timely objection.
The supreme court first held that the search warrants were
invalid:
Before the issuing magistrate can properly perform his
official function he must be apprised of the underlying
facts and circumstances which show that there is probable
cause to believe that proper grounds for the issuance of the
warrant exist. Mere affirmance of the belief or suspicion
on the officer's part is not enough. To hold otherwise would
attach controlling significance to the officer's belief rather
than to the magistrate's judicial determination .... There-
fore, the affidavits in question here containing only the
conclusion of Officer Borden . . without setting forth facts
and circumstances from which the judicial officer could
determine whether probable cause existed were fatally de-
fective. The warrants issued thereon were nullities.
49
It then held that the search, as incident to a lawful arrest, was
unreasonable:
[T]he search, whether under a valid search warrant or
whether as incident to a lawful arrest, must be one in which
the officers are looking for specific articles and must be
conducted in a manner reasonably calculated to uncover
such articles. Any search more extensive than this consti-
tutes a general exploratory search and is squarely within
the interdiction of the constitutional guarantee against un-
reasonable search and seizure.50
Since there is no other way that a search and seizure can be
"reasonable" than under authority of a search warrant or incident
to a lawful arrest, the dictating machine was illegally seized; and
the motion to suppress should have been granted.
In dicta, the court made two other points. An officer conduct-
ing "a lawful search, either under a valid search warrant or incident
to a valid arrest where the search is such as is reasonably designed
to uncover the articles he is looking for,"51 may seize any contra-
band, or article, the possession of which is a crime, which he dis-
covers in the course of the search without fear that it will be ex-
cluded from evidence.
Furthermore, any alteration of a search warrant, even correct-
ing an address, by any person other than a judicial officer, is im-
proper. It is not made clear in the decision, however, whether this
invalidates the warrant or leaves it valid according to its original
tenor.
49 385 P.2d at 999.
50 Id. at 1000.
51 Ibid.
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A. When the Court Will Decide a Question
Not Raised by the Parties
It is an established principle of constitutional law that only
issues which are duly raised and insisted upon, and are adequately
argued, will be considered; and that generally a court will not in-
quire into the constitutionality of a statute on its own motion.52
Yet constitutional questions are often of immediate importance to
the general public as well as to the parties. Recognizing its duty to
resolve such questions where the legislation is "patently unconstitu-
tional and void, and under which many persons are receiving unfair,
discriminatory, and unlawful treatment," the Supreme Court of
Colorado last year considered and determined the constitutionality
of a statute not questioned by either party at trial or on appeal. 53
Under a 1947 act,54 as amended in 1959, 55 a mosquito control
district along the Animas River Valley and encompassing part of
the City of Durango was created. It included property owned by the
plaintiff in error telephone company. The company petitioned the
district court to declare that its property was not a part of the dis-
trict, relying on an exclusionary provision of the act. 56 The trial
court construed the provision adversely to the company and denied
the petition.
On appeal the initial briefs and arguments of the parties related
to the construction of the exclusionary clause, but the supreme
52 City of Golden v. Schaul, 105 Colo. 158, 95 P.2d 806 (1939). See also People ex rel. Attorney
General v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939); Clark Hardware Co. v. Centennial Tunnel
Mining Co., 22 Colo. App. 174, 123 Poc. 322 (1912).
53 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Animos Mosquito Control Dist., 380 P.2d 560 (1963).
54Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-3 (1953). This article provides for the establishment of metropolitan
districts for the purpose of water supply, sanitation, fire, police and safety protection. It establishes
organizational procedure, district powers, and procedure for dissolution.
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-3-2(7) (Perm. Supp. 1960). The amendment provides for the creation of
mosquito control and street improvement districts.
56Colo. Rev Stat. § 89-3-3 (1953). " ... A district may consist of noncontiguous tracts or
parcels of property but no single tract or parcel of land containing more than twenty acres of which,
together with the buildings, improvements, machinery and equipment thereon situate shall have an
assessed valuation in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars . . . may be included . . . without
written consent of the fee owners .... "
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court ordered additional briefs and argument on the constitution-
ality of the section and on whether the balance of the act would
survive if that section were severed.
The court took pains to indicate that its action in considering
the constitutional question was an extraordinary measure, but said:
"Courts in many jurisdictions, including Colorado, have held that,
under circumstances such as we have here, it is proper for the court
sua sponte or on motion of a person not aggrieved to pass on the
constitutionality of a statute.
' 57
Once having determine that it could reach the constitutional
question, the court held that the exclusionary provision was viola-
tive of the state and federal constitutions:
The exemption provision . . . is a flagrant violation of
Article 5, Section 25 of the Constitution of the State of Colo-
rado in that it is special legislation; and that it fails to pro-
vide for all persons "the equal protection of the laws"
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.58
As reason for this holding, the court stated that the attempted
classifications are discriminatory. It quotes 12 Am. Jur. Constitu-
tional Law § 481 to the effect that "a classification to be valid must
rest upon material differences between the persons included in it
and those excluded."59 The quoted material in the original text
refers only to the federal constitution.
Although it is not completely clear, this appears to be a state-
ment that the prohibition of article V, section 25, includes the pro-
hibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws, so that any violation of the latter would also
be a violation of the former. This implication has not been made so
clearly before but is not inconsistent with prior Colorado cases.60
Except for the exclusionary clause, the statute was held to be
valid. The court determined that the statute was severable and that
exclusion of the clause did not prevent the remainder from stand-
ing alone.
In a companion case,61 the court found an exclusionary provi-
57 380 P.2d at 653. It should be noted that four of the six cases from other jurisdictions cited in
support of this statement are at best of doubtful precedential value. Two Tennessee cases,
Algee v. State, 200 Tenn. 127, 290 S.W.2d 869 (1956), and Remine v. Knox County, 182 Tenn. 680,
189 S.W.2d 811 (1945), seem to indicate that the chancellor in Tennessee may consider the con-
stitutionality of a statute on his own motion in any circumstance. Even if this inference is incorrect,
the question of the constitutionality of the statute was raised by the pleadings in both of these cases.
In State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210 (1948), the issue before the
court was one of res judicata. No constitutional question was under consideration. The court's
statement that constitutional questions could be decided ex mero motu where matters of public
concern are involved, must be considered mere obiter dictum.
In United Textile Works of America v. Lister Worsted Co., 91 R.I. 15, 160 A.2d 358 (1960), the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island did not consider the constitutionality of a statute, and expressly
declined to consider whether the trial judge had erred in doing so. It did indicate that there
were situations in which the court might use its own initiative to consider a statute's constitution-
ality, but gave no clue as to what they were. The decision was made on other grounds.
Since it is clear that the statement of the court is in accord with prior cases in Colorado, City
of Golden v. Schaul, 105 Colo. 158, 95 P.2d 806 (1939), it is not felt necessary to further pursue the
actual status of the law in other jurisdictions.
58 380 P.2d at 565.
59 Id. at 566.
60 See, e.g., McCarty v. Goldstein, 376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962); Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527,
351 P.2d 851 (1960); People ex rel. Dunbar v. People ex rel. City & County of Denver, 141 Colo. 459,
349 P.2d 142 (1960); Board of Trustees v. People ex rel. Behrman, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490 (1949);
Allen v.Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); Rifle Potato Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith, 78
Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); Consumers' League of Colorado v. Colorado & S. Ry., 53 Colo. 54,
125 Pac. 577 (1912); People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 94 Pac. 294 (1908).
61 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Sable Water Dist., 380 P.2d 569 (1963).
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sion in a statute establishing water and sanitation districts 62 void
for similar reasons.
B. Stare Decisis
In People v. Quimby63 the court was called upon to interpret
state constitutional provisions to decide which of two appointees
should hold office as Garfield County Commissioner. The incumbent
commissioner died in office after his re-election, but prior to the
commencement of the new term. Governor McNichols appointed
Quimby ".... to hold office as by statute provided, to-wit: until the
next general election and until his successor elected thereat shall
have been duly qualified .. -64 At the expiration of the commis-
sioner's term of office, Governor Love, who had succeeded Governor
McNichols, appointed Diemoz to the office. Diemoz took the oath
and otherwise qualified but was refused recognition by Quimby.
The court held that, despite the apparently clear language of
article IV, section 9, of the Colorado Constitution 5 and of C.R.S.
'53 § 35-3-9,66 the appointee holds the office until the next general
election only if no new term commences in the interim. If a new
term does so commence, he holds only-until an appointee for the
new term is named and qualified. Under this rule, Diemoz was
adjudged the rightful holder of the office.
The court indicated that had the case been one of first impres-
sion, the decision might have gone the other way. It felt compelled,
however, to follow the precedent set by two prior cases 67 which held
that the language of article XII, section 10, of the Colorado Con-
stitution" was controlling. The office is vacant whenever the person
neglects to qualify for it, even if the reason is death, and regardless
of the existence of any incumbent.
While recognizing that the ruling that the office is vacated is
a minority view, Mr. Justice Day said:
The doctrine of "stare decisis" should be adhered to in
the absence of sound reason for rejecting it. If a decision
is palpably wrong or great social changes have been
wrought so as to make the prior decision repugnant to
rather than in aid of the constitution, a court may be justi-
fied in overruling prior interpretation of the constitution.
No such compelling reasons present themselves here.
6 9
The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Frantz, found the decision of
the court to be the equivalent of a judicial "amendment" to the
constitution, since the rule it applied in deciding the case was not
in accord with the plain meaning of the words of the constitution.
He argued that the true principle which should control the court's
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-5-4 (1953).
63 381 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1963).
64 The appointment is quoted Id. at 276.
65 "In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of county commissioners, the governor shall
fill the same by appointment; . . . and the person appointed shall hold the office until the next
general election, or until the vacancy be filled by election according to law."
66 "In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of county commissioner, the governor shall fill
the same by appointment of a person . . . The person appointed shall hold the office until the next
general election or until the vacancy be filled by election according to law, and until his successor
shall be qualified."
67 Gibbs v. People, 66 Colo. 414, 182 Pac. 894 (1919); People ex rel. Callaway v. De Guelle,
47 Colo. 13, 105 Pac. 1110 (1909).
68 "If any person elected or appointed shall refuse or neglect to qualify therein within the
time prescribed by law, such office shall be deemed vacant."
69 381 P.2d at 277.
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interpretation of the constitution was not stare decisis, a common
law doctrine, but the limitation expressed in the constitution itself,
in article II, section 2-that the power to alter or abolish the con-
stitution is vested solely in the people. He approved the following
language:
The only power which the Supreme Court has to inter-
fere with the sovereign will of the people, is when there is a
violation of the federal compact. If the constitution makers
had used doubtful or uncertain language, it is the province
of this court to say what it [sic] really meant by such
doubtful or uncertain language, but it is neither the duty
nor province of this court to substitute any other language
for that used by the constitution makers, nor to place any
forced construction upon such language, nor to eliminate
any language from the organic law of the people.
70
III. DECISIONS OF INCIDENTAL INTEREST
Because of a difference of opinion between El Paso County
Commissioners and the judges of the Fourth Judicial District, the
Supreme Court of Colorado was called upon to decide whether the
judicial or the legislative branch was vested with ultimate authority
to fix salaries of certain court employees. In upholding the lower
court decision in Smith v. Miller7' in favor of the judiciary, the
court interpreted the controlling legislative enactment 2 in the light
of article III of the state constitution.
7 3
In its opinion, the court virtually adopted the conclusion of the
trial court:
It is an ingrained principle in our government that the
three departments of government are coordinate and shall
co-operate with and complement, and at the same time act
as checks and balances against one another but shall not
interfere with or encroach on the authority or within the
province of the other .... It is abhorrent to the principles
of our legal system and to our form of government that
courts, being a coordinate department of government,
should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries of an ex-
trinsic will. Such would interfere with the operation of the
courts, impinge upon their power and thwart the effective
administration of justice.
74
The court held that the duty of the commissioner was a minis-
terial one rather than a discretionary one except where the amounts
are so unreasonable as to indicate that the judges acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.
70 381 P.2d at 282, quoting from People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Curtice, 50 Colo. 503,
522, 117 Pac. 357, 363 (1905). Emphasis added by Mr. Justice Frantz.
71 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963).
72 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-16-1 (1953). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "The judge or
judges of the district court of each judical district shall appoint one or more probation officers
who shall not be dismissed without good cause shown. The judge or judges shall fix the salary
of such officers commensurate with the time required to discharge the duties hereunder, subject
to the approval of the county commissioners of the counties of such judicial district."
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 56-3-8 (1953) contains a similar provision regarding clerks.
73 "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments -
the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted."
74 384 P.2d at 741.
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